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Not quite as British as Finchley: the failed attempt to bring
British Conservatism to Northern Ireland
Colin Coulter*
Maynooth University, Co. Kildare, Ireland
In a previous issue of Irish Studies Review I examined the unanticipated emergence in
the late 1980s of a series of Conservative associations in Northern Ireland. In this
follow-up article, I will seek to account for the subsequent swift and ignominious
decline in the early 1990s of the Northern Irish Conservatives. While the fortunes of the
Ulster Tories were undermined by a number of contingencies – the vagaries of
parliamentary arithmetic and their own lack of political judgement foremost among
them – their fate was sealed primarily by certain rather more structural concerns.
In particular, the rapid decline of the Conservative associations in Northern Ireland
owes its origins to the historically “loveless marriage” between Ulster unionists and the
British state. The unionist community simply refused to vote in meaningful numbers
for a political party at the centre of a Westminster establishment deemed hostile to the
cause of the Union. In addition, the Conservative hierarchy would inevitably prove
unwilling to nurture their own party associations in Northern Ireland as this
“integrationist” project ran precisely counter to their own longstanding political
ambitions for the region. This conflict of interests and intentions would in short order
ensure the demise in all but name of the Northern Irish Conservatives. There can be few
more dramatic illustrations of the mutual distrust that conjoins Ulster unionists and the
British state than the string of lost deposits incurred by Conservative candidates
running for office in Northern Ireland.
Keywords: Ulster unionism; Northern Ireland; Anglo-Irish Agreement; British
Conservatism; electoral integrationism
Introduction
On the afternoon of Friday 15 November 1985, the British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and her Irish counterpart Garrett FitzGerald met at Hillsborough, Co. Down to
sign a political accord that for the first time afforded the Dublin government a consultative
role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The initial furious response of unionists
1
to the
advent of the Anglo-Irish Agreement would give rise to a campaign of opposition which,
while intense and prolonged, would ultimately serve little real purpose.
2
Their inability to
resist the implementation of the Hillsborough Accord starkly underlined the lack of
political influence or imagination of a Unionist leadership that had long since elevated
inertia to the status of philosophical ideal. As the political and intellectual weakness of
mainstream Unionism quickly became ever more apparent, the space opened up for
alternative strategies and ideas.
3
In this context of ideological flux, a political enterprise
that had previously existed only on the margins of Northern Irish political life would for a
time move to the centre stage.
4
The advocates of “equal citizenship” or “electoral integration” counselled that the
crisis summoned by the Anglo-Irish Agreement was best conceived as merely the latest
symptom of a rather more fundamental political malaise.
5
The principal source of the
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“Northern Ireland problem” was, electoral integrationists insisted, the historic exclusion of
the region from the wider party political life of the UK. As the British political parties had
hitherto refused to accept members from or stand candidates in the six counties they were
in a position to blithely ignore the interests and ambitions of people living there. The
advent of “equal citizenship” would, however, swiftly serve to redress this democratic
deficit. Once the people of Northern Ireland were able to join the principal parties of the
British state they would be in a position to forge networks and exert an influence that
would begin to shape the conduct of political power. In particular, the electoral integration
of the region would enable voters in the six counties to initiate those often relatively small
shifts of political favour that can transform government into opposition. Fearful of
electoral retribution, those parties that hoped to exercise executive power in the UK would
be loathe to consider political initiatives that might prove offensive to citizens living in
Northern Ireland. The realisation of “equal citizenship” would, in others words, ensure that
political developments such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement would in the future simply
become inconceivable.
The energy and seeming idealism of the electoral integrationist case ensured that it
exercised a resonance among many unionists disenchanted with the political and
intellectual indolence that often seemed to define the mainstream unionist response to the
crisis summoned by recent events at Hillsborough Castle.
6
While the ideal of “equal
citizenship” had originally been nurtured by a small splinter of the far left it would,
ironically, bear fruit principally in the guise of a campaign to bring British Conservatism
to Northern Ireland.
7
As the 1980s drew to a close, a sequence of fledgling Conservative
associations began to appear in the more affluent constituencies within Belfast and its
hinterland. While the hierarchy of the party was deeply resistant to the prospect of
recognising these “model” associations,
8
it would soon become apparent that the
campaign to extend Conservative politics to Northern Ireland was rather more popular
among rank-and-file Tories.
9
On 10 October 1989, a motion was placed before the
Conservative annual conference advocating that Northern Irish people should be allowed
to join the party.
10
Amid euphoric scenes, the controversial move was endorsed by the
overwhelming majority of delegates gathered at Blackpool – to the astonishment of many
commentators and the dismay of quite a few.
11
In overcoming the reticence of the Conservative Party hierarchy, the Ulster Tories had
secured a remarkable political victory. Indeed, the pressure group that agitated specifically
for membership of the Conservative Party had been established a mere eighteen months
before the eventful Blackpool conference. The swift success of their campaign would,
however, serve to inflate the expectations and, perhaps, cloud the judgement of the
Northern Irish Conservatives. As the 1980s came to an end, many Ulster Tories firmly
believed themselves to be on the verge of a genuine political breakthrough. The handful of
local elections in which they had already stood had seen Conservative candidates perform
strongly. While these predominantly affluent and overwhelmingly unionist constituencies
were unlikely to provide genuinely representative tests of their electoral potential, the
Ulster Tories were quick to point to a series of surveys of political opinion appearing to
indicate that there existed sufficient space for Conservative politics to flourish in Northern
Ireland. One particular, respected opinion poll – the British Social Attitudes Survey –
even seemed to suggest that the Conservatives might well become the single largest
political party in Northern Ireland.
12
The support for Conservative politics that a series of surveys suggested to be latent
within the Northern Irish electorate would, however, never fully materialise.
13
The high
water mark of the Ulster Tories came in the Westminster elections of 1992 when they
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secured 44,608 votes, some 10% of the poll in the eleven constituencies in which they had
stood. While this performance might otherwise have been deemed respectable, the failure
to secure the principal target constituency of North Down profoundly undermined the
fledgling Northern Ireland Conservatives as they struggled to establish themselves as a
credible political force. The subsequent swift and ignominious decline of the Ulster Tories
was confirmed in the local government elections held in May 1993. Conservative
candidates were routed even in council districts where previously they had drawn
substantial support. In total, the Ulster Tories secured less than 1% of first-preference
votes. A mere four years after those heady scenes at the annual conference in Blackpool,
the movement to bring Conservative politics to Northern Ireland seemed to have already
run its course.
This essay is the second of two articles in which I have sought to account for the
particular, dramatic arc mapped out by the Northern Irish Conservatives. In a previous
issue of Irish Studies Review, I set out to explain that, while often greeted with incredulity,
the emergence of Conservative associations in the six counties in the late 1980s
represented a rational and perhaps even inevitable attempt on the part of the unionist
middle classes to resolve the contradictions that had defined their experience of direct rule
from Westminster.
14
In this follow-up article, I will seek to examine why it was that the
attempt to fold Northern Ireland into the wider party political life of the state ultimately
transpired to be such a dismal failure. As with its predecessor, the present essay draws
upon two valuable forms of primary data. Firstly, the author conducted interviews with
thirty Northern Irish members of the Conservative Party between 1992 and 1993. Excerpts
from these interviews are used at various stages to illustrate or underline the issues at hand.
Secondly, the essay draws on analysis of data generated by the 1989 and 1990 editions of
the British Social Attitudes Survey. The information on 274 Conservative “identifiers”
living in Northern Ireland furnished by these two instalments of the survey offered crucial
insights that shape the discussion that follows.
A loveless marriage
The verve and apparent idealism of electoral integrationism would exert an attraction for
many unionists rendered more receptive to new ideas and strategies by the trauma that was
the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
15
While the sense of ambition that pervaded the movement for
“equal citizenship” was central to its appeal it also represented one of its fundamental
shortcomings. If we are to understand the swift demise of the electoral integrationist
project in the 1990s, we need to locate it in the context of one of the many troubled
relationships that have traditionally defined the “Northern Ireland problem”. The ideal of
equal citizenship was, at its heart, an attempt to redress and recast the manner in which the
unionist community and the British state relate to one another. It would quickly become
only too apparent, however, that neither party to this notoriously “loveless marriage” was
willing to cooperate with this ambitious enterprise.
16
The disposition of the unionist community in Northern Ireland has traditionally been
defined by a deep distrust of the intentions of the British state.
17
In the minds of unionists,
the parties of government are at best indifferent to their interests and at worst would
actually prefer a constitutional future for Northern Ireland beyond the realms of the
Union.
18
This abiding suspicion of metropolitan ambitions has, in the era since Stormont
was prorogued at least, prompted Unionist politicians to assume a certain critical distance
from the political establishment in Westminster. The electoral integrationist camp
contested that this reticence had, however, served ultimately to undermine the unionist
Irish Studies Review 3409
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cause. In the era of direct rule, the advocates of equal citizenship insisted, real political
influence could only be exercised within the parties of government at Westminster. Once
admitted to the Conservative and Labour Parties, members from Northern Ireland would
be able to shape policy and to stay the hand of those who might wish to dilute or even
dissolve the Union. The advent of electoral integration would mean that a political
initiative such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement that drew the ire of the majority of people in
the six counties would become simply unthinkable:
Author: Obviously the major catalyst for the emergence of the Northern Ireland Conservatives
was the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Did the Agreement have much of an impact on you, on your
political outlook?
Interviewee: Yes, I felt that the democratic views of the people of Northern Ireland had been
ignored totally and that that had been possible because the Unionist Party had put itself out on
a limb with no means of contact with the party of government. It became isolated and I feel
strongly if they hadn’t allowed themselves to do that the Anglo-Irish Agreement would never
have been signed and certainly if the Conservative Party here had been active at the time it
also wouldn’t have been signed.
The electoral integrationist project sought to map out a boldly different direction for a
unionist community that had been disorientated by the unheralded Hillsborough
Accord.
19
When Conservative associations emerged in the late 1980s, unionists were, in
principle, being invited to immerse themselves in the wider political culture of the UK.
The decision of the unionist electorate to decline this invitation was prompted largely by
an abiding wariness towards the British state. On numerous occasions, I accompanied
Conservatives canvassing in the tree-lined avenues of prosperous constituencies such as
South Belfast and North Down. The reception on the doorstep was more often than not
distinctly frosty. Wealthy individuals who would have been Conservatives had they been
living in any part of the UK would show little reticence when informing canvassers
that they could not bring themselves to vote for a party which they considered not to
have their interests at heart and which had, after all, signed the loathed Anglo-Irish
Agreement:
20
Author: When I watched Tories canvassing it became obvious that a lot of voters wouldn’t
vote for them because of their distrust of the British parties. Has that been a big problem?
Interviewee: Yes. I don’t agree with it but it is a problem. People are of the opinion “stick with
our boys, our boys will look after us”. But our boys are not in a position to look after us,
because our boys are always on the opposition benches. And that of course is where the
perception of a devolved parliament at Stormont comes in: “We’ll have our own wee
government and our own wee government will look after us.” But again that falls down
because “our wee government” at Stormont only has the powers that Westminster deigns to
devolve to it. In 1972 whenWestminster decided to shut up shop, I mean Stormont didn’t even
have the power to save itself, let alone do anything else.
The principal appeal of the electoral integrationist project was that it seemed to offer the
prospect of political influence at a time when the mainstream Unionist parties had been
mercilessly exposed as having none. Those individuals who for a time joined the ranks of
the Conservative associations that appeared in the late 1980s invariably stated that their
main motivation was a desire to alter the course of government policy, in particular in
relation to Northern Ireland. It would soon become apparent, however, that most unionists
simply did not believe that operating within the Conservative Party would afford them any
real political influence and considered that it might in fact be used to dissipate their
opposition to the Hillsborough Accord, thereby rendering them yet more vulnerable still.
The prospect of participating in the wider political culture of the state evidently exercised
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rather less of an appeal than its advocates assumed to a unionist community that
stubbornly refused to dispense with the traditional assumption that its interests would be
best served by retaining its own parties and seeking the restoration of its own separate
institutions of government. The disenchantment with the British political establishment
pervasive among unionists would quickly and perhaps inevitably prove fatal for the Ulster
Tories. There can be few indices that have captured quite so graphically the unionist
community’s distrust of the British state as the sequence of lost deposits suffered by the
Northern Ireland Conservatives.
If the unionist community were entirely unwilling to alter its disposition towards the
British state, the other party to that distinctly unhappy union would transpire to be no less
reticent.
21
From the moment of its creation, Northern Ireland was regarded and treated by
the political establishment in London as a rather less than equal and integral region of
the UK. The institution of a devolved assembly consigned the six counties to a mere
antechamber of the Union, well beyond the field of vision of the sovereign parliament until
the eruption of violence in the late 1960s signalled that the partition settlement was
unravelling. As the political climate deteriorated apace in Northern Ireland, Westminster
declared the dissolution of the Stormont legislature in March 1972. While the introduction
of direct rule offered the political establishment in London the opportunity to govern the
six counties in the same manner as the rest of the UK, it continued, predictably, to treat the
region as “a place apart”.
22
After the fall of Stormont, Westminster administered Northern
Ireland as one might a distant colonial possession, with ministers wielding almost entirely
unaccountable powers and legislation being passed without parliamentary debate via the
executive fiat of “Orders in Council”.
23
The realisation of equal citizenship would, therefore, have required the British state to
dispense with an essentially colonial disposition that has defined its conception and
treatment of Northern Ireland since partition. If electoral integration were to be properly
achieved, in other words, the parties that aspire to form a government at Westminster
would have to embrace Northern Irish members as equals and to govern the six counties as
though they were – in Margaret Thatcher’s stridently disingenuous phrase – “as British as
Finchley”. In reality, however, the political establishment in London seemed intent on
continuing to treat Northern Ireland as fundamentally “different” to the rest of the UK
even after the historic decision to affiliate Conservative associations formed in the
province.
24
The hierarchy of the party had been strongly opposed to affiliation and often
appeared to proceed as though that particular development had simply never occurred.
25
Indeed, in her memoir of her time as Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher did not consider
the affiliation of the Ulster Tories as a matter even worth mentioning.
26
In an interview
with the author conducted in 1993, more than three years after the historic decision at the
Blackpool conference, the Northern Ireland Office Minister Richard Needham underlined
that many senior officers of the Conservatives remained largely unaware of the fortunes of
their fellow Tories across the Irish Sea:
Author: What is the attitude of the hierarchy of the Conservative Party and Conservative
Central Office to the Northern Irish Conservatives? Are they keen in terms of what’s going on
with the Conservatives here?
Needham: To be honest, it doesn’t appear on their television screens very much. There’s the
possibility of one seat which frankly if we’d someone at the last election who’d supported the
government and ridden in on my coat tails and what I’ve done I think we’d have won that seat.
But we were never going to win that seat with someone who’s clearly less of a Conservative
than the sitting member is. So for Conservative Central Office . . . You can say that Northern
Ireland politically generally is marginal if you look at it in British terms as a whole. What is it,
Irish Studies Review 5411
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two and a half per cent of the population of the United Kingdom? So it is marginalised in that
sense. And the Conservative vote is even less than that . . .
The comments of Richard Needham suggest that the seeming indifference of the
Conservative Party hierarchy to their members living in Northern Ireland was driven in
part at least by pragmatic electoral concerns. In a confidential memorandum produced by
the Conservative Research Department in late 1988 to discuss the implications of the
prospective affiliation of the Ulster Tories it was stated quite baldly that “they would stand
little chance of winning any seats” in Westminster elections.
27
This rather saturnine
estimation would be repeated in several other internal reviews and would of course prove
to be entirely accurate. Reading through these various memoranda there is a very strong
sense that the Conservative Party was simply loathe to divert resources into candidates
running in Northern Ireland who had no realistic chance of winning. One memo written in
advance of the affiliation of the Ulster Tories expressed misgivings at the prospect of
installing a full-time organiser in the region,
28
while another dated shortly afterwards
underlined that there would be no financial support whatsoever extended to Conservatives
standing for election in the six counties.
29
While the parsimony of Conservative Central
Office certainly reflected a familiar bureaucratic aversion to squandering resources, it
might also be taken to have revealed another, rather more ideological disposition. The
reluctance of the Tory hierarchy to finance candidates in Northern Ireland who had little or
no chance of winning had of course a certain logic to it, but it was deeply at odds with their
approach in other regions of the UK. The Conservative Party did, after all – as it continues
to do – routinely stand candidates in many regions of the state where there was no prospect
of securing a seat. In doing so, it was seen to fulfil its obligations as a genuinely “national
party”, as one that had at least sought a mandate in every constituency. Even after
affiliation, however, many senior Tories seemed to have little sense of the need to seek
such symbolic legitimation in a Northern Irish context. The aversion of Conservative
Central Office to financing candidates in the six counties reflected, then, not merely a
certain bureaucratic tight-fistedness but, altogether more importantly, the understanding
that the seemingly historic decision at the Blackpool conference had changed little, that
Northern Ireland was to remain “a place apart”.
30
The abiding sense among the British political establishment that Northern Ireland is
fundamentally “different” would inevitably and perhaps fatally undermine those who
sought to bring Conservative politics to the region. At its heart, the equal citizenship
project was an attempt to persuade the British state that complete integration would in time
allow the six counties to evolve and operate like any other region of the UK. The fate of the
Ulster Tories would suggest that the principal political players in Westminster and
Whitehall remained unconvinced. When the decision was made to allow the affiliation of
Northern Irish associations, the Conservative Party was already committed to a political
strategy that would not seek to nurture the potential sameness of the region but rather to
acknowledge its actual difference. The political future mapped out for Northern Ireland
was one that entailed a nascent talks process that was intended to lead to the restoration of
a regional assembly in Belfast run along consociational lines. While senior Tories were in
the main robust advocates of devolution for the six counties, they were also of course
steadfastly opposed at the time to such a settlement in any other region of the UK.
31
In view of the well-established political priorities of the Conservative government, the
sudden emergence of the Ulster Tories was inevitably regarded as a deeply unwelcome
development at senior levels of the party. A sequence of memoranda from the time
suggests that there was considerable concern within Smith Square that the affiliation of
C. Coulter6412
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Northern Irish associations might frustrate and perhaps derail the political process that was
evolving at characteristically glacial pace in the region. One position paper drafted shortly
before the Blackpool conference suggested that the almost certainly poor performance of
Conservative candidates running in future elections would underscore that the Secretary of
State had no electoral mandate in Northern Ireland and would thus undermine further his
authority among and over the local political parties.
32
A further concern within the party
hierarchy was that the emergence of the Ulster Tories would erode the crucial claim to
impartiality of the Westminster government.
33
How, after all, was the Secretary of State
to maintain the air of an “honest broker” in the prospective talks if members of his own
political party were seated among their electoral competitors on the other side of the
negotiating table?
The response of the Conservative Party to dilemmas of this kind was, predictably, to
seek to prevent the further development of what were in principle their own associations in
Northern Ireland. There were admittedly occasional kind words and gestures of support
from senior Tories. Two Northern Ireland Office Ministers – Richard Needham and Peter
Bottomley – did, after all, canvas for the Conservative candidate Colette Jones when she
ran during the Upper Bann by-election in May 1990.
34
In the main, however, Conservative
Central Office extended little practical or moral support to their members living in
Northern Ireland. Indeed, on several occasions the Secretary of State Peter Brooke was
asked by journalists whether he would recommend to the Northern Irish electorate that
they vote Conservative and he simply refused to do so.
35
The pointed indifference of
senior figures within the party to the interests of their members living in the six counties
was of course profoundly detrimental. Conservative candidates standing in Northern
Ireland in effect found themselves in the unsustainable and possibly unique position of
asking voters to support a party that did not in fact genuinely want their votes. It was
always entirely inevitable that the electorate would decline the opportunity to do so:
Interviewee: If a political party and its main spokesman are not coming out and repeatedly
making the case to the electorate as to why the electorate should vote for that party rather than
voting for other political parties then the electorate will detect that there’s something not quite
right, there’s something bogus about that party. And what we have seen in Northern Ireland
after the Conservative Party took the decision to organise here is that successive Secretaries of
State instead of getting up and propounding what the benefits of Conservative politics would
be and having a Conservative MP and Conservative councillors would be, instead of doing
that they have continued in the totally same colonial mode of staying aloof from the electorate
in Northern Ireland saying that they have no particular interest in Northern Ireland. Absolutely
ridiculous. I mean it was completely letting people down who were prepared to support the
Conservative Party here by coming out with statements such as “the Conservative government
has no interest in Northern Ireland”, this sort of thing. And instead saying that their role here
was to try and get agreement between other political parties. The only reasonable analogy it
seems to me is to imagine Ian Laing or his predecessor Malcolm Rifkind getting up in front of
an audience at Glasgow’s Kelvin Hall or the Assembly Rooms in Edinburgh and saying:
“Well as Conservative Secretary of State I have to say that I regard my major task as getting
agreement between the Labour Party, the Scots Nats and the Lib Dems on a way to govern
Scotland because my party has no selfish interest in the affair at all . . . ”
The prospects of the electoral integrationist project were hindered not only by the broad
strategic imperatives of the British state but also by the rather narrower instrumental
concerns of the party that at the time held its reins. The Conservative government of the
day frequently strove to cast itself as a neutral referee that sought solely to nurture
agreement among the various quarrelsome political voices within Northern Ireland.
In reality, however, there existed longstanding, if admittedly problematic, connections
between the Tories and what was then still the principal political force in the six counties.
Irish Studies Review 7413
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From the moment of its foundation, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was affiliated to the
National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations and the party’s MPs took the
Tory whip at Westminster. As Smith notes, the half-century of devolved government that
followed partition created greater distance between Unionists and Conservatives. With the
outbreak of the Troubles, however, the “cordial neglect” of the Stormont years would give
way to rather more fractious relations between the two parties.
36
The decision of a
Conservative administration to prorogue the legislature in Belfast prompted Ulster
Unionist MPs to relinquish the Tory whip. The remaining ties between the two parties
were finally severed in 1986 as an expression of Unionists’ sense of betrayal at the signing
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
37
The ideal of electoral integration came to prominence, therefore, at a time when
relations between the historic allies of the Conservative and Ulster Unionist Parties had
been profoundly damaged. While the gulf between the two parties was considerable and
indeed often appeared irreparable, there were forces within both camps that aspired
towards a rapprochement. The advent of Conservative associations in Northern Ireland
was identified by figures in Smith Square as a potential stumbling block in the path of
improved relations with the Ulster Unionists. A policy paper drawn up in advance of
affiliation, for instance, underlined that if “at some admittedly hypothetical point in the
future” there was a possibility of cooperating once again with Unionist MPs the existence
of the Ulster Tories “would make this extremely difficult – if not impossible”.
38
Another
internal memorandum dated 20 February 1990, some four months after the decision taken
at Blackpool, noted that the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party James Molyneaux had
“indicated that it would be inconceivable for Unionists to work closely with us –
let alone take the Conservative whip – if Unionists were challenged by Conservatives at
the next General Election”.
39
The tone of these missives suggests that there were within
the British Conservative Party some rather divided political loyalties. If there were to be
a tug of war for the affections of Conservative Central Office between the Northern Irish
Conservatives and the UUP it was clear from the start that the latter would hold a distinct
strategic advantage. Not only were the Ulster Unionists close to the Conservatives in
ideological terms, they also, more importantly, already had a substantial and seemingly
secure foothold in the Westminster parliament. The nine seats won in the 1992 General
Election lent the UUP disproportionate political influence in the context of an
increasingly divided Conservative administration that had only a small and dwindling
majority. The lure of potentially vital votes ensured that it was ever more likely that
the embattled Major government would seek to come to an understanding with the
Ulster Unionists. In an interview with the author on 19 February 1993, the Northern
Ireland Office (NIO) Minister Richard Needham hinted at the prospect of such a
rapprochement:
Author: What is the attitude of the hierarchy of the Conservative Party and Conservative
Central Office to the Northern Irish Conservatives? Are they keen in terms of what’s going on
with the Conservatives here?
Needham: . . . The danger they face is what will happen within the Unionist Party.
The interesting thing in the years to come may be whether the Unionist Party actually says that
it will come back into the Conservative fold.
Author: Do you think it would be welcomed back?
Needham: I don’t know. I mean one’s got to say that there appears to be as much in common
between the Official Unionist Party and the Conservatives in government as there is between
the Conservatives in Northern Ireland and the Conservatives in government.
C. Coulter8414
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The prognostication offered by Richard Needham would prove rather prescient, save at
least for the timeframe suggested. Within five months of the comments above, the
beleaguered government of John Major had, as we shall see later, struck a deal with the
Ulster Unionists that would in effect entail the Conservative Party abandoning its own
members in Northern Ireland to their fate.
“People who knew how to direct affairs”
The emergence of electoral integrationism as a pervasive and for a time persuasive voice
in the late 1980s represented in part a scathing rebuke of established Unionist politics.
Those who were drawn to the standard of equal citizenship in the wake of the Hillsborough
Accord were wont to dismiss the mainstream political parties as having offered a stunted
and parochial vision of unionism that had consigned the people of Northern Ireland to the
“window ledge of the Union”.
40
This critique was given especially colourful expression
by the most high-profile champion of electoral integration – the charismatic but divisive
barrister and Unionist politician Robert McCartney – who was wont to talk of “pygmy
politicians” content within the confines of a “Lilliputian sectarian politics where they can
crow over their own little dung hills”.
41
The individuals who joined the ranks of the
Conservative associations that emerged at the time often mentioned that their choice was
informed in part by the conviction that the other parties articulating a unionist position
were indelibly sectarian:
Author: Why did you join the Conservatives rather than one of the local parties?
Interviewee: To my way of thinking our local parties here had a sectarian aspect to them.
We all know that the Orange Order has quite an involvement in the Unionist Party and vice
versa
42
which would make it a bit difficult for, for example, a conservative Catholic living in
Northern Ireland to become a member. So part of my reason for not applying for membership
of the Unionist Party is that I personally feel that religion should not be mixed up with politics
the way they are here. I feel it’s a very negative thing and it’s only going to bring us trouble
until we get it sorted out.
The narrow sectarianism of mainstream Unionism was at times held to be associated
closely with its particular socio-economic composition. In the course of an interview with
the author, one academic who was active in the South Belfast association marked his
repugnance at the “class aspect” of the main Unionist parties:
Author: Why did you join the Conservatives and not, say, the Ulster Unionists?
Interviewee: Well to join a political party I think you have to feel at home within it and for
whatever reason I guessed that I wouldn’t feel at home in the Unionist parties. I’m not sure
why that might be. Maybe it’s the Orangeism, or maybe it’s the class aspect. You could call it
snobbery.
Author: What do you mean by that – “the class aspect”?
Interviewee: Well, I suppose there’s the perception that politics in Northern Ireland is a very
rough business, and that might be linked up – I know this all sounds very unpleasant – with
the types who are represented in the political parties . . .
The emergence of the electoral integrationist movement in the late 1980s represented in
part an attempt to resolve the presumed iniquities of mainstream Unionism. Over the
course of the Troubles, commentators often noted that the conflict had largely prompted
the unionist middle classes to abandon Northern Irish political life. Those who sought to
bring British Conservatism to the six counties were in effect seeking to reverse this
particular political exodus. The appearance of Conservative associations in certain affluent
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Northern Irish constituencies gave form to a desire to create another version of unionist
politics, a more lucid and expansive one that had discarded the sectarian baggage of the
past and was guided by newly energised figures from the professional and business
classes.
43
In the following excerpt, a successful management consultant living on one of
the most exclusive streets in South Belfast expresses his desire for the return of the middle
classes to Northern Irish political life:
Author: How did you think that the Conservatives could improve the local political scene?
Interviewee: Well, I thought that the Conservatives could bring in more of the professional
classes who had opted out of politics for the last fifteen years. People of influence, people who
knew how to direct affairs. They would understand the dynamics of the Northern Ireland
political situation and be able to act within a party of influence.
For a time, it appeared that the electoral integrationist camp might just succeed in its quite
explicit ambition to transform the class composition of Northern Irish politics. As the
1980s drew to a close, the campaign to bring British Conservatism to the region had
considerable momentum and seemed to exercise an appeal among those affluent social
strata that had hitherto largely shunned local political life.
44
The spatial distribution of
constituency organisations, the accents to be heard at public meetings and the occupational
backgrounds of the principal party spokespersons all served to underscore that the nascent
Conservative associations in the province drew principally on the talents of the
professional and business classes. The characterisation of the Northern Ireland
Conservatives offered by anecdotal information was – as we saw in the predecessor to
this article
45
– confirmed and fleshed out more fully by the information offered by the
1989 and 1990 editions of the British Social Attitudes Survey. Between them, these polls
offered insights into the backgrounds and outlook of some 274 respondents who claimed
to “identify” with the Tories rather than with a local political party.
The data garnered by the British Social Attitudes Survey confirmed the common-sense
understanding that support for the Conservative Party was to be found among the more
affluent sections of Northern Irish society. The Ulster Tories emerged as being distinctly
more privileged than those who aligned themselves with one of the provincial political
parties. Conservative “identifiers” were, for instance, one and a half times more likely to
fall into the highest bracket of income earners (31% versus 20%) and had substantially
more chance of owning their place of residence (76% versus 61%). The data furnished by
the British Social Attitudes Survey indicated, therefore, that the Conservative associations
that sprang up in parts of Northern Ireland in the late 1980s had drawn principally from the
ranks of the professional and business classes. This was scarcely a revelation, of course.
The class profile of the Ulster Tories merely echoed, after all, that to be found in any other
Conservative association in any other region of the UK at the time or, for that matter,
since. Indeed, in their campaign to gain admission to the party, the Ulster Tories were at
pains to underline their similarities to rank-and-file Conservatives living “across the
water”. In the early months of 1989, the fledgling North Down association produced an
audio cassette designed to make the case for affiliation to the National Union. The opening
narrative of the tape depicts an idyllic pastoral setting that is clearly intended to establish
the impeccable bourgeois credentials of the Ulster Tories:
On a glorious sunny afternoon in the summer of 1988 a group of people sat sipping drinks in a
pleasant country garden filled with the scent of roses and the sound of humming bees and
singing birds. As the afternoon wore on the conversation turned to what is loosely called
“politics”. One of the group was a doctor who remarked upon the problems he was facing with
regard to wastage in the hospital where he was based, a problem which he felt could almost
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certainly be solved by putting the service in question out to private tender. Another was a
businessman interested in the possibility of expanding his company in 1992. A third was a
solicitor boning up on a new Act which was about to change the current legislation. Just the
sort of thing you’d expect to see anywhere in the Home Counties. But these people were
different. They didn’t live in England. They lived in the United Kingdom, yet they weren’t
truly part of that Kingdom. Each one wished to support government policy, yet none had ever
had the opportunity. Each one was a Conservative, yet none could join the Conservative Party.
Each one had something to contribute to the party in talent, time and funds, yet they were not
wanted. Why? Because they lived in Northern Ireland . . .
The typically well-heeled individuals who founded the Conservative associations that
sprang up in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement were evidently of the view that they
would make a more persuasive and inclusive case for the Union than those who had
previously been charged with the task. The Ulster Tories were, after all, men and women
who had guided successful business and professional careers and these attributes were
presumed to identify them as “people who knew how to direct affairs”. The confidence of
the Northern Irish Conservatives in their own political acumen would, however, soon be
exposed as mere hubris. The professional and business figures who were involved in their
local Conservative associations had very little experience of the notoriously demanding
world of Northern Irish politics. Most of the Ulster Tories whom I interviewed –
seventeen out of thirty – had never been politically active before and none had previously
held a senior position in a political party. The danger that attended this lack of political
inexperience was disclosed shortly after a reluctant Nation Union agreed to affiliate
associations from Northern Ireland.
The death of the Unionist MP Harold McCusker in February 1990 offered the Ulster
Tories the first opportunity to test their electoral strength since affiliation. While many
Conservatives were acutely aware that Upper Bann was unlikely to provide fertile ground
for their version of integrationist politics, it was decided nonetheless to put forward a
candidate. The already substantial challenges that faced the Conservative campaign were
compounded further by the absence of a high-quality candidate or even an adequate
constituency organisation. These weaknesses were immediately recognised within
Conservative Central Office. From the moment of her selection, the Conservative
candidate Colette Jones was characterised as “diffident”, “inexperienced and politically
inept”.
46
The reservations that circulated among the party hierarchy would prove to have
been entirely justified when the polls in Upper Bann closed on the evening of 17 May
1990. The Ulster Tories had performed even worse than expected, limping in sixth with
barely 3% of the poll and losing their deposit. This result inevitably represented a
devastating blow to a fledgling political organisation trying to establish its bona fides with
a famously partisan Northern Irish electorate.
47
The lack of tactical sense that was mercilessly exposed in the decision to compete the
Upper Bann by-election was also echoed at the level of political strategy. Among the many
difficulties that faced the Northern Irish Conservatives after affiliation was how best to
deal with what was now – in name at least – their own party. If there was in fact a strategy
in this regard it appeared to entail the simultaneous adoption of two mutually contradictory
and comparably ruinous approaches. The first of these was that the Ulster Tories were
from the outset vocal opponents of every aspect of policy devised by their party to deal
with the political specificities of Northern Ireland. The most high-profile Conservative in
the region, Dr Laurence Kennedy, was among the most vehement critics of the
Hillsborough Accord and was public in his opposition to the nascent talks process that
began in the spring of 1991.
48
The strident stance adopted by the Ulster Tories would serve
little ultimately to advance their interests. In “bickering” constantly over official policy in
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relation to Northern Ireland, Conservatives living in the region began to alienate even
those figures within the hierarchy of the party who were not previously hostile to them.
49
Furthermore, the seeming fixation of the Ulster Tories with issues such as the Anglo-Irish
Agreement often made them virtually indistinguishable from the mainstream Unionist
parties which in turn alienated potential Catholic voters whose support was indispensable
if they were ever to realise their professed ambition to transform the face of Northern Irish
politics. While the fierce opposition of Conservatives to party policy on Northern Ireland
limited their appeal among the nationalist electorate, it would ultimately fare little better
with unionist voters. It would soon become apparent that unionists were simply
unprepared to accept the sincerity or credentials of candidates who declared their devotion
to the UK yet chose to belong to a political party that had given life to what was in unionist
eyes the most treacherous threat to the Union in living memory. In sum, then, the
opposition that the Ulster Tories offered to official policy towards Northern Ireland had the
effect merely of alienating opinion on either side of the Irish Sea and making enemies both
within and without their own party.
The second approach pursued by the Northern Irish Conservatives was rather more
conciliatory but no less counter-productive. Among the many allegations levelled at the
Conservative associations that emerged in the late 1980s was that they had been created by
people who were not in fact Tories but rather Unionists seeking to pursue traditional
objectives via alternative channels. At the time, critics were wont to deploy the metaphor
of “old wine in new bottles”.
50
This line of criticism generated considerable resentment
and gave rise among the Ulster Tories to a certain anxiety to establish their ideological
fidelity to the party they had only recently joined. There was a propensity among
Conservatives living in Northern Ireland to slavishly endorse those fiscal measures
proposed for the UK as a whole. This devotion to the social and economic policies
conceived in Westminster and Whitehall was rather poorly timed. It is worth remembering
that the affiliation of the Ulster Tories occurred at a very particular moment in the long arc
of Conservative government in the UK. By the time that the first official Conservative
candidates stood for office in Northern Ireland, their party had begun to unravel, with
divisions over Europe becoming increasingly apparent and social and economic policy
ever more peculiar. The Ulster Tories would, however, prove themselves prepared to
endorse even the most eccentric fiscal measures advocated by Westminster. Hence, the
Conservative associations in Northern Ireland were willing to express support for
swingeing public expenditure cuts, a stance that would inevitably play poorly with the
electorate in a region where the state sector and the local economy have long since been
more or less coterminous.
51
Furthermore, as the introduction of the notoriously unpopular
community charge was sparking major popular unrest elsewhere within the UK, the Ulster
Tories were seeking to establish their devotion to the cause by calling for the introduction
of the “poll tax” to Northern Ireland. It is hard to imagine even the “pygmy politicians” of
mainstream Unionism falling prey to such an elementary lapse of political judgement.
52
The afterlife of the Northern Irish Conservatives
While the errors sketched above meant that the Northern Ireland Conservatives were often
the authors of their own misfortune, they were also at times unwitting victims of
circumstance. In the summer of 1993, the Conservative government had only a slim
majority in Westminster and required the votes of the nine Ulster Unionist MPs to pass the
Maastricht Treaty in the House of Commons.
53
In return for their support, the Unionists
extracted certain concessions from the ailing Major administration. One of these was the
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understanding that the Conservative associations in the six counties would be allowed to
“wither on the vine”.
54
A principal claim of the Ulster Tories had from the outset been that
they would have more power inside the party of government than the Ulster Unionists
could ever hope to exercise outside. The events at Westminster in the summer of 1993
appeared to suggest that perhaps the very opposite might – under certain propitious
conditions at least – be rather closer to the truth.
The deal struck during the horse-trading that surrounded the Maastricht Treaty issued a
more or less fatal blow to the Northern Ireland Conservatives who were already reeling
from their disastrous performance in the local government elections.
55
The timing of their
demise as a meaningful political force would seem, in hindsight, perhaps rather
appropriate. A few months later, after all, the Conservative Secretary of State would
address the House of Commons to confirm rumours that discussions had taken place
between the government and the Republican movement. In making this disclosure, Sir
Patrick Mayhew intimated that the British state possessed a very specific vision of the
political future for Northern Ireland. The peace process would of course ultimately prove
able to accommodate many different strands of political opinion. It was readily apparent
from the outset, however, that the political future of the six counties was one that would
have no room for those integrationist impulses that had, for a brief time at least, animated
the attempt to bring British Conservatism to Northern Ireland.
While the prospect of the Ulster Tories becoming a meaningful political force in
Northern Ireland ended in the summer of 1993, they have retained a nominal presence ever
since. Those few Conservative candidates who would run subsequently for election in
Northern Ireland would in all cases poll poorly. In recent years there have, however, been
two separate attempts to revive the fortunes of the Ulster Tories. In 2009, it was announced
that the remaining Conservative area council was to forge an electoral pact with the Ulster
Unionists under the guise of the Ulster Conservatives and Unionists – New Force
(UCUNF). The rather unwieldy title of the new alliance coupled with the very public
quarrelling among those who sheltered under its umbrella did little to endear it to the
Northern Irish electorate. The electoral prospects of UCUNF were undermined further
when it was announced that the sole remaining Ulster Unionist representative at
Westminster had left the party. Lady Sylvia Hermon declared that she could not
conscience standing as part of the alliance as she simply was not a Conservative and
decided instead to run successfully as an independent candidate in the 2010 elections.
56
The departure of the North Down MP inevitably meant that the attempt to rekindle the
previously close relations between the Conservatives and once powerful Ulster Unionists
would yield not a single Westminster seat.
With the debacle of the 2010 general election over, the ill-starred political alliance that
was the UCUNF was quietly dismantled. Seemingly undeterred by this latest electoral
disappointment, the few remaining stalwarts among the Northern Irish Conservatives set
about changing their political fortunes once more. The summer of 2012 saw a glitzy re-
launch of the Ulster Tories as a political brand at the newly minted Metropolitan Art
Centre. The optimism that seemed to pervade the press conference convened in one of the
principal emblems of the “new Belfast” would, however, quickly dissipate.
57
Those Tories
who ran for office in the 2014 local government and European elections fared no better
than their predecessors had over the previous quarter century. Furthermore, the
Conservative candidate for the European parliament, Mark Brotherston, came last,
receiving only 4144 first preferences, less than 1% of the ballots cast. In view of this latest
debacle, it would seem reasonable to suggest that if the Northern Irish Conservatives do
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indeed have a political future it will be one that will be littered with a succession of lost
deposits.
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